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Essay 
FRIENDLY, J., DISSENTING 
MICHAEL BOUDIN† 
American legal culture takes the dissent for granted as a natural 
companion to the majority decision of the court, but this is a 
parochial view. In early years, the British tradition was divided, with 
the Privy Council barring and the House of Lords permitting the 
publication of dissents;1 even today, some Continental countries 
disallow them.2 In the United States, Chief Justice Marshall did what 
he could to press for unanimous opinions.3 And years later, in 1924, a 
judicial-ethics canon of the American Bar Association decried 
dissents as tending to undermine faith in the courts.4 
Yet dissents have a capacity to reveal the views of an individual 
judge in ways that panel decisions do not. Writing only for himself, 
the dissenting judge does not need to compromise with anyone, can 
employ a more personal voice, and can focus on issues of special 
importance to him. Judge Henry Friendly is reckoned one of the 
greatest federal judges to sit on the federal appellate bench in the 
twentieth century, with no circuit court peer other than Judge 
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 † Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. This Essay, in a slightly more 
condensed version, was delivered as the McCorkle Lecture at the University of Virginia School 
of Law in February 2011. Thanks are due to my then-law clerks, Jacob Heller, Joanna Huey, 
Matthew Guarnieri, and Jonathan Bressler, and to my friends Judge Pierre Leval, Judge 
Richard Posner, and Professor John Deutch, who each read an earlier draft of this Essay. 
 1. Michael Kirby, Judicial Dissent—Common Law and Civil Law Traditions, 123 L.Q. 
REV. 379, 385–86 (2007). 
 2. Id. at 382. 
 3. M. Todd Henderson, From Seriatim to Consensus and Back Again: A Theory of 
Dissent, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 283, 311–24 (discussing Chief Justice Marshall’s success in 
instituting the unanimous opinion); Charles F. Hobson, Defining the Office: John Marshall as 
Chief Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1421, 1442–44 (2006) (explaining that Chief Justice Marshall 
“deliberately departed from the traditional mode of seriatim opinions” and that “[o]nce firmly 
established, the single majority opinion survived for the duration of the Marshall Court”). 
 4. CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 19 (1924) (asserting that “[e]xcept in case of 
conscientious difference of opinion on fundamental principle, dissenting opinions should be 
discouraged in courts of last resort”). 
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Learned Hand. Judge Friendly wrote many dissents, almost all full-
scale opinions done with his customary skill and learning. 
During his nearly twenty-seven years on the bench—from 
September 1959 to March 1986—Judge Friendly wrote not only 800 
or so published majority opinions for his own court but also 103 
dissents and 88 opinions that were either concurrences or partial 
dissents.5 All of these separate opinions may be fairly treated as 
dissents to some degree. Even when an opinion began with the phrase 
“Friendly, J., concurring,” and even when Judge Friendly joined in 
the panel’s judgment, his rationale usually differed from the 
majority’s. A different rationale matters, of course, because it often 
points to a different result on somewhat different facts. 
Thus, in substance, Judge Friendly took a position that diverged 
from the panel majority almost 200 times. This number may seem 
modest as a percentage of the 2800 or so panel decisions in which he 
participated during his career, but it is a significantly higher 
percentage than the ones generated by most of his colleagues.6 
Because Judge Friendly’s separate opinions represent about 20 
percent of his total opinions, they constitute a substantial body of 
work that invites a critique. 
Let me start by recalling Judge Friendly’s remarkable 
background: his astounding A-double-plus average at Harvard Law 
School—more than one full grade level above the then-rarely 
conferred summa cum laude degree, which Judge Friendly also 
received—his clerkship with Justice Brandeis, his association with 
John Harlan—later the second Justice Harlan—at the Root Clark law 
firm in New York, his cofounding in 1946 of the Cleary Gottlieb law 
firm, and his service thereafter both as a founding partner at that firm 
and as a full-time vice president and general counsel of Pan American 
 
 5. No authoritative count of Judge Friendly’s opinions exists, and assigning exact numbers 
is complicated by the fact that although most of Judge Friendly’s opinions were written in 
Second Circuit cases, the judge also served occasionally on three-judge district courts as well as 
on the special rail-reorganization court established by Congress. The numbers set forth in the 
text of this Essay are derived from Westlaw searches that sought to identify Judge Friendly’s 
majority opinions, concurrences, and dissents as a circuit judge. 
 6. According to Westlaw’s classifications, see infra Appendix, Tables 1–2, the percentage 
of Judge Friendly’s cases in which he dissented—3.64 percent—was somewhat higher than for 
most others who sat as active judges while Judge Friendly was in active service; and his 
percentage of concurrences—3.11 percent—was appreciably higher than most others’. If one 
combines both of these percentages, one will see that Judge Friendly wrote separately in a 
higher percentage of cases than all but two judges in this group—Judges Walter Mansfield and 
Paul Hays. 
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World Airways.7 No legal audience needs to be reminded of Judge 
Friendly’s heroic scholarship in books, articles, and book reviews, all 
written in his “spare” time.8 
As for Judge Friendly’s judicial career, the judge joined the 
Second Circuit in 1959, when the famous bench manned by the two 
Judge Hands—Learned and Augustus—as well as Judges Thomas 
Swan, Charles Clark, and Jerome Frank had almost completely 
disbanded. Judge Friendly did overlap with Judge Learned Hand, but 
only briefly. The Second Circuit in 1959 was beginning to grow, 
however, and over the course of his tenure, Judge Friendly had 
seventeen different colleagues. Many of his colleagues were very able 
figures, and the mention of two among them—Judges Ralph Winter 
and James Oakes—serves to underscore that Judge Friendly fell in 
the middle of the liberal-conservative spectrum, insofar as that 
spectrum can be adapted to describe judicial attitudes. 
So it may be worth considering why Judge Friendly, a moderate 
figure and the acknowledged intellectual star of his court, failed so 
many times to win a second vote for his position. But something must 
first be said about other important matters: Judge Friendly’s 
approach to legal issues, the style and substance of his dissents, and 
what observers can learn from those dissents about the judge’s own 
priorities with respect to the issues most worth the trouble of a 
separate opinion. Finally, one should ask about his influence as a 
judge and a dissenter and about the role that dissents play in the 
judicial process. 
All of Judge Friendly’s opinions, whether for panels or for the 
judge himself, flowed from a common conception about judging. 
Given his education and his experience, Judge Friendly had no 
illusion that judicial decisions are the impersonal voice of the oracle 
 
 7. See THE YALE BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LAW 208–09 (Roger K. 
Newman ed., 2009) (providing biographical information about Judge Friendly’s academic and 
professional accomplishments); Michael Boudin, Judge Henry Friendly and the Craft of Judging, 
159 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 8 (2010) [hereinafter Boudin, Craft of Judging] (“What can be gleaned of 
[Judge Friendly’s] work as general counsel of Pan American World Airways during its heyday 
confirms that business lawyering was at least part of his repertoire. In fact, he served as well as 
vice president of the company and as a member of its board of directors.”); Michael Boudin, 
Judge Henry Friendly and the Mirror of Constitutional Law, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 975, 977–78 
(2007) [hereinafter Boudin, Mirror] (“At Harvard Law School, . . . Friendly became a 
legend. . . . Friendly was president of the Harvard Law Review and ranked first in his class.”). 
 8. Boudin, Mirror, supra note 7, at 976 n.2 (listing a sample of Judge Friendly’s major 
works). A list on Westlaw of Judge Friendly’s articles, book reviews, and lectures includes more 
than thirty entries and is by no means complete. 
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or that any given case yields only one permissible result, let alone 
only a single possible explanation for that result. Although such 
notions were the target of legal realists during Judge Friendly’s early 
years, the judge’s own views were probably closer to those of the so-
called legal-process school than to those espoused by legal realism.9 
Yet Judge Friendly did not fit neatly into any camp of legal 
philosophy or even find the subject of legal philosophy to be one of 
any special interest. 
A common view of law, probably representing the way most 
judges in the twenty-first century think they do their job, is this: that 
judging is an endeavor by which certain accepted materials, such as 
statutes and decisions, will, when subjected to an accepted set of 
techniques—including textual study, inquiry into the underlying 
policy, and reasoning by analogy—point toward answers or, in closer 
cases, will at least inform and constrain choice. Under a more extreme 
“formalist” view—the view against which the realists reacted—judges 
think that rules determine everything, that a right answer necessarily 
exists for every legal problem, and that only bias or lack of 
competence can explain conflicts. 
The legal-process school sharply differs from this formalist view 
in various ways—for example, by recognizing that case law has 
evolved in accordance with social needs and by giving special 
attention to institutional competence. Nevertheless, the legal-process 
school insists that “reasoned elaboration” of the grounds of decision 
remains crucial to providing justification, continuity, and guidance.10 
 
 9. Legal realism refers to a set of perspectives on judicial decisionmaking that stress the 
study of the results reached by judges and those judges’ perceived underlying motivations, 
rather than the formal explanations provided in their opinions. Its best known exponents, who 
differed among themselves in their emphases and interests, thrived in the 1920s, ’30s, and ’40s. 
See generally G. Edward White, From Sociological Jurisprudence to Realism: Jurisprudence and 
Social Change in Early Twentieth-Century America, 58 VA. L. REV. 999 (1972) (describing “the 
displacement of [sociological jurisprudence] by [realism] in the first three decades of the 
twentieth century”). 
 10. See William W. Fisher, III, Legal Theory and Legal Education, 1920–2000, in 3 
CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA: THE TWENTIETH CENTURY AND AFTER (1920–), 
at 34, 41 (Michael Grossberg & Christopher Tomlins eds., 2008) (“[Reasoned elaboration] 
encompassed at least three, related guidelines. . . . [First,] a judge must assume a posture of 
intellectual disinterestedness . . . . Second, . . . judges should consult with their colleagues before 
coming to conclusions. . . . Finally, judges must in their opinions explain their reasoning 
thoroughly, both to provide effective guidance to future litigants and to enable constructive 
criticism of their decisions.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); G. Edward White, The 
Evolution of Reasoned Elaboration: Jurisprudential Criticism and Social Change, 59 VA. L. REV. 
279, 291 (1973) (noting that “legal scholars of the 1950’s grew increasingly convinced of the 
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Perhaps this perspective has a special hold on those judges—like 
Judge Friendly—who are most gifted in deploying the materials and 
techniques by which an explanation is provided. 
Let me explore, then, the character of Judge Friendly’s dissents. 
All of Judge Friendly’s opinions were formidable, but with respect to 
the dissents in particular, the word “devastating” comes swiftly to 
mind. The measured self-restraint of Judge Friendly’s former partner, 
the second Justice Harlan—himself a regular dissenter on the Warren 
Court during the same era—was rarely visible in Judge Friendly’s 
own dissents. Rather, in Judge Friendly’s dissents, mildly biting 
comments about the majority decision were common.11 Showing that 
those comments stung, sometimes an acute concurring judge in the 
majority—such as Judge Jon Newman—would be moved to respond 
for himself and to offer a further defense of the majority’s position.12 
When Judge Friendly dissented, tone was the least of the panel’s 
problems. Judge Friendly’s knowledge of common-law doctrine was 
bolstered by his own background as a prize-winning history student at 
Harvard College. Judge Friendly’s deft handling of statutory 
construction was unmatched, and one of his major articles—
nominally about his own mentor Justice Felix Frankfurter—was on 
 
importance of judicial rationalization” and describing “Reasoned Elaboration” as a summary of 
“a new set of ideals and standards for judicial decision-making”). 
 11. See, e.g., Goodwin v. Oswald, 462 F.2d 1237, 1251 (2d Cir. 1972) (Friendly, J., 
dissenting) (“This case is a classic example of what I have called ‘the domino method of 
constitutional adjudication . . . , wherein every explanatory statement in a previous opinion is 
made the basis for extension to a wholly different situation.’” (omission in original) (quoting 
Henry J. Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 929, 
950 (1965))). Nor were counsel automatically exempt from a barb or two. See, e.g., id. at 1248 
(“On this appeal we see The Legal Aid Society, a venerable organization long supported by 
private charity and more recently also by large public grants, assuming the role of solicitors for a 
prisoners’ union.”). 
 12. E.g., Dickerson v. Fogg, 692 F.2d 238, 247 (2d Cir. 1982) (Newman, J., concurring) 
(“Judge Friendly’s dissent contends that the circumstances under which [the victim] identified 
[the defendant] at the arraignment of [the defendant’s] cousin were not sufficiently suggestive to 
warrant assessment of the reliability of the identification under the criteria set forth in [Neil v. 
Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972)]. I share the dissent’s concern that the police should not be obliged 
to act in a ‘wholly unnatural fashion,’ but I am satisfied that no such requirement has been 
imposed by the decision of this case.” (citations omitted) (quoting Dickerson, 692 F.2d at 249 
(Friendly, J., dissenting))); Hansen v. Harris, 619 F.2d 942, 958 (2d Cir. 1980) (Newman, J., 
concurring) (“Judge Friendly’s vigorous dissenting opinion concludes that the case law has 
generally opposed estoppel of the Government, and that the substance-procedure distinction 
cannot be maintained in this context. My review of the authorities persuades me that estoppel of 
the Government enjoys considerable support and that the substance-procedure distinction 
makes the doctrine especially appropriate in the circumstances of this case.”). 
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that very subject.13 More broadly, Judge Friendly’s fertility of mind 
could furnish arguments in quality and number well beyond those 
offered by counsel. 
Nor was anyone Judge Friendly’s equal in the close parsing of 
case law. Consider this piece of vivisection in one dissent, directed at 
the precedents relied on by the panel majority. The case, Mitchell v. 
Cuomo,14 concerned a preliminary injunction granted by the district 
court to prevent the closing of a prison and the consequent transfer of 
its prisoners to another prison alleged to be already overcrowded.15 
The district court had granted the injunction on the ground that an 
Eighth Amendment violation had been plausibly alleged, although 
not yet proven.16 In upholding the preliminary injunction, the panel 
majority invoked the support of a concurring opinion in the Supreme 
Court’s Rhodes v. Chapman17 and a prior decision of the Second 
Circuit, Lareau v. Manson.18 Judge Friendly, however, read the 
majority opinion in Rhodes as warning federal judges to avoid 
intruding into state prison administration unless clear-cut violations 
of the Eighth Amendment were demonstrated and countered the 
majority’s citations in this fashion: 
We should look for guidance to the majority opinion in Rhodes, 
representing the views of six justices, rather than, as the [panel] 
majority here does, to the concurring opinion, which represents the 
views of only three, or to our own opinion in Lareau v. Manson, [a] 
portion of which relied on . . . [a Sixth Circuit decision] . . . that was 
reversed by the Supreme Court only a fortnight after Lareau was 
decided.19 
Along with Judge Friendly’s legal skill came an unusually 
thorough command of the record. The judge began one separate 
opinion on an ominous note: “Although the [panel] opinion’s 
statement of facts is accurate as far as it goes, a somewhat fuller 
narrative is needed to place the matter in proper setting.”20 Typically, 
 
 13. Henry J. Friendly, Mr. Justice Frankfurter and the Reading of Statutes, in FELIX 
FRANKFURTER: THE JUDGE 30 (Wallace Mendelson ed., 1964). 
 14. Mitchell v. Cuomo, 748 F.2d 804 (2d Cir. 1984). 
 15. Id. at 805–06. 
 16. Id. at 806. 
 17. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981). 
 18. Lareau v. Manson, 651 F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1981). 
 19. Mitchell, 748 F.2d at 808–09 (Friendly, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
 20. Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, 429 F.2d 1136, 1145 (2d Cir. 1970) (Friendly, J., 
dissenting). 
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in such cases, Judge Friendly would move methodically on to mine 
the record for further facts, to draw inferences that the majority had 
overlooked, and to discredit witnesses whose testimony underpinned 
the panel’s position. 
One such instance was Friendly’s dissent in a case called Sea-
Land Service, Inc. v. Aetna Insurance Co.21 In that case, a ship that 
had gone aground was being towed free by another vessel.22 In the 
process, the tow line broke and the ship was thrown against the rocks 
and damaged.23 Under admiralty law, a contribution by the cargo 
owner to the repair costs, otherwise borne by the ship’s owner alone, 
would ordinarily have been required.24 But the district judge had 
denied such a recovery by the ship’s owner on the ground that the 
same damage would probably have resulted even without the failed 
tow.25 On appeal, the panel majority did a fairly persuasive job of 
upholding the denial of contribution—persuasive, that is, until one 
reads Judge Friendly’s dissent.26 
What Judge Friendly showed, moving from fact to law and back 
to fact again, was that the portions of the district court’s findings on 
which the panel majority relied were more ambiguous than they 
initially appeared. The key findings—in Judge Friendly’s words—had 
“the . . . elusive quality of seeming to say more than [they] really 
[did].”27 And what Judge Friendly found, buried in those ambiguous 
findings, was a subtle confusion by the district judge about the correct 
legal standard to be applied. Judge Friendly’s summing up, terse but 
elegant, went thusly: 
  In my view the difficulty here has arisen because of the district 
court’s shift from the standard it enunciated at the end of the 
trial, . . . [specifically, whether the rescue effort involving the 
attempted tow increased the likelihood of the loss at issue,] to the 
concept . . . [that contribution] would not lie if it was ‘more likely 
than not that the . . . [loss would have occurred], regardless of 
whether the tow had been attempted.’ Since we all agree that the 
 
 21. Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 545 F.2d 1313 (2d Cir. 1976); id. at 1318–20 
(Friendly, J., dissenting). 
 22. Id. at 1314–15 (majority opinion). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 1315. 
 25. Id. at 1316. 
 26. Id. at 1318–20 (Friendly, J., dissenting). 
 27. Id. at 1319. 
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former is the correct standard, I would reverse and remand for 
explicit findings in regard to it.28 
Unraveled, Judge Friendly’s point was that the rescue effort—
conceded to have been a legitimate effort to avoid much more severe 
damage—could have increased in some measure the risk of the lesser 
damage that resulted when the tow rope broke. Even if the same 
lesser damage would probably have occurred without the tow, any 
significant increase in the risk of such damage was traceable to the 
reasonable rescue effort undertaken on behalf of both the ship’s 
owner and the cargo owner to avoid a feared greater damage. Given 
admiralty law’s aim of encouraging such reasonable rescue efforts, a 
finding on remand of significant increased risk ought to be enough to 
require a contribution to cover the ensuing loss when the effort 
miscarried. 
Although Judge Friendly’s dissents always had such penetration, 
the occasions for the judge’s separate opinions varied widely. Some 
involved major questions of law and policy on which a dissenting 
view, if held, had to be expressed. But, as further examples show, 
Judge Friendly also on occasion wrote separately when the issue was 
largely factual, when the result was right but the analysis wrong, or 
when a party was being unfairly treated. His lightning speed in both 
thought and expression made it comfortable for him to dissent 
whenever he disagreed, and he disagreed fairly often. 
This was so in part because Judge Friendly saw in his mind’s eye 
more dimensions of a case than do most judges. In addition to 
possessing great analytical skills and a memory stocked with doctrine, 
citations, and legal history, Judge Friendly—like a great chess 
player—could foresee the remote dangers of a holding or distinction 
proposed by the majority. Given all these capabilities, that he differed 
from other judges is no wonder. And, having arrived at a “better” 
answer, he did not hesitate to express it. Judge Friendly listened 
carefully, even to young law clerks, but he made up his mind quickly 
and decisively and had no false modesty. 
Looking at four recurring themes in Judge Friendly’s separate 
opinions, one can perhaps learn something more about the judge’s 
priorities. These themes gave his dissents an energy that may have 
been more diffused even in a majority opinion by Judge Friendly 
himself that covered the same terrain. Put differently, when a judge is 
 
 28. Id. at 1320 (quoting id. at 1316 (majority opinion)). 
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writing a panel opinion covering the full range of issues presented, 
even strongly held preferences may appear to be just part of the 
landscape. Judge Friendly’s dissents sometimes reveal emphases that 
are less obvious in his opinions for the court. 
First, despite Judge Friendly’s criticism of various ventures of the 
Warren Court into criminal-law reform—for example, its invention of 
new exclusionary rules and its drastic expansion of habeas corpus29—
an abiding concern with fairness permeated Judge Friendly’s 
decisions in criminal cases: in his attention to the possible innocence 
of a defendant, in his insistence on government disclosure of 
exculpatory evidence and on the defendant’s right to effective cross 
examination, and in his blunt censuring of his own court whenever it 
failed to give a party a fair chance to make out a case.30 
Regularly, Judge Friendly found flaws in convictions that did not 
trouble his other colleagues. Here is a typical example: In United 
States v. Ross,31 the defendant had been convicted in a federal district 
court on a single count of simple possession of one-eightieth of an 
 
 29. E.g., Friendly, supra note 11, at 936 (“It is not obvious to me why determining which of 
the interests protected by the Bill of Rights against the nation shall also be protected against the 
states, or holding that the amendments mean something hardly suggested by their text, are 
permissible objective judgments . . . . To say as the Court recently did, ‘the Self-Incrimination 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment which we made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth,’ 
sounds pretty subjective to me.” (footnote omitted) (quoting Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 
611 (1965))); Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attacks on Criminal 
Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 142, 145 (1970) (asserting that the Court’s willingness to allow 
collateral attacks that are unsupported by proof of innocence would make “[t]he proverbial man 
from Mars . . . surely think we must consider our system of criminal justice terribly bad”). 
 30. E.g., United States v. Rush, 666 F.2d 10, 13–16 (2d Cir. 1981) (Friendly, J., dissenting) 
(“In my view affirmance of this conviction [for conspiracy to import marijuana into the United 
States] is not a proper exercise of the power, conferred upon [this court] . . . , to ‘require such 
further proceedings to be had as may be just under the circumstances.’” (quoting 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2106 (1976))); United States v. Ciambrone, 601 F.2d 616, 627–29 (2d Cir. 1979) (Friendly, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that the majority had failed to appreciate the necessity of 
“maintain[ing] . . . prosecutorial candor,” in light of the central role of the grand jury in securing 
basic liberties, and asserting that when a prosecutor fails to provide candid responses to a grand 
jury’s questions, a “substantial possibility” that the grand jury would not have indicted had they 
been given the requested information “is all that is needed to warrant . . . quashing the 
indictment”); United States v. Capanegro, 576 F.2d 973, 983 (2d Cir. 1978) (Friendly, J., 
dissenting) (“The understandable desire that [the defendant] should not escape criminal 
punishment should not lead us to extend the statute beyond what Congress directed.”); United 
States v. Frattini, 501 F.2d 1234, 1238 (2d Cir. 1974) (Friendly, J., dissenting) (“[R]eversal of 
[the defendant’s] conviction is necessary in justice not only to him but [also to his 
codefendant]. . . . This is the rare narcotics case where the defendants may be innocent. There 
must be a new trial . . . .”). 
 31. United States v. Ross, 719 F.2d 615 (2d Cir. 1983). 
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ounce of cocaine—ordinary cocaine, not crack.32 The drug had been 
found in a search of the defendant’s apartment conducted by agents 
of the Internal Revenue Service who were investigating tax offenses 
that had allegedly been committed by the defendant’s restaurant 
business.33 The majority of the appeals court panel, joined by Judge 
Friendly, remanded for a new trial on a misinstruction issue, but 
Judge Friendly dissented from the court’s refusal to require a hearing 
on the defendant’s selective-prosecution claim.34 
Judge Friendly’s dissent described the dubious conduct of and 
threats by the prosecutors aimed at securing the defendant’s aid in 
snaring his drug suppliers.35 Full cooperation, the prosecutor had 
indicated, would lead to the dropping of all charges and the 
defendant’s entry into the Federal Witness Protection Program; lack 
of cooperation, the defendant said he had been warned, would result 
in his being charged separately on each and every possible tax and 
drug count available.36 This was too much for Judge Friendly, who, 
asking only for a hearing on the disputed factual allegations, wrote in 
part, 
  I recognize that the ability to offer leniency in return for 
cooperation is an indispensable tool of law enforcement. I also 
appreciate the undesirability of sanctioning a new defense unrelated 
to the merits that might require extensive pretrial proceedings. But I 
would want to think long and hard before deciding that selective 
prosecution, initiated by information [without the protection of a 
grand jury], for a trivial offense not generally prosecuted, following 
conduct such as [defendant] and his counsel allege, did not go 
beyond constitutional bounds . . . .37 
Second among the recurring themes was that of relative 
competency—of examiner versus agency, trier of fact versus 
reviewing court, and court versus legislature, executive branch, or 
commission. “I fear,” Judge Friendly wrote in one instance, “[that] 
this is another case . . . where appellate judges are whetting their 
 
 32. Id. at 616. 
 33. Id. at 617. 
 34. Id. at 622 (Friendly, J., dissenting). 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 622–23. 
 37. Id. at 623. Judge Friendly added, “The majority’s phrases, ‘declined to aid’ and ‘failure 
to cooperate,’ are hardly adequate to describe the kind of assistance that would require 
participation in the Federal Witness Protection Program.” Id. (quoting id. at 620 (majority 
opinion)). 
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appetite for dealing with facts rather than leaving these to the district 
judge who saw and heard the witnesses.”38 That measured modesty, 
reaching back to Professor James Bradley Thayer in one realm and to 
Justice Frankfurter in others, was common in Judge Friendly’s 
opinions, whether for the court or for the judge himself. Again and 
again, Judge Friendly’s position and posture recalled Goethe’s 
observation: “None proves a master but by limitation.”39 
Running through all that Judge Friendly wrote was yet another 
thread, one that owed something to his temperament and much to his 
years in law practice: attention to the practical. Whether assessing 
substantive law, an evidentiary error, or a remedy on remand, Judge 
Friendly thought that the judgment of courts should be anchored in 
real-world conditions and should aim at getting the world’s work 
done. If Justice Jackson was the patron saint of this church, then 
Judge Friendly was a devout disciple. 
Consider as an example Judge Friendly’s dissent in Hansen v. 
Harris.40 At the time that case was being decided, the Social Security 
regulations required a written application for benefits and allowed 
claims for periods preceding the written application to go back only 
one year.41 In Hansen, a divorced widow had applied for and received 
benefits for the future and for one year prior to her application, but 
she sought benefits also for earlier years that were seemingly 
precluded by the one-year limitation period.42 She argued that when 
she had inquired earlier about eligibility, the agency’s representative 
had misled her into not filing an application by saying that she was 
ineligible because she was divorced from her insured ex-husband. In 
fact, as she later discovered, her ex-husband’s death had made her 
eligible for mothers’ benefits notwithstanding the divorce.43 
 
 38. Chem. Transporter Inc. v. Reading Co., 426 F.2d 436, 439 (2d Cir. 1970) (Friendly, J., 
dissenting); see also N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Conn. Dev. Auth., 700 F.2d 91, 97 (2d Cir. 1983) 
(Friendly, J., dissenting) (“Judge Carter was in a far better position than we are to determine 
whether [the defendant’s] counsel consented to an order requiring discontinuance of the New 
York action. He had the ‘feel of the case which no appellate printed transcript can impart.’” 
(quoting Cone v. W. Va. Pulp & Paper Co., 330 U.S. 212, 216 (1947))). 
 39. JOHANN WOLFGANG VON GOETHE, Nature and Art, in SELECTED POEMS 165 
(Christopher Middleton ed., Michael Hamburger trans., 1983). 
 40. Hansen v. Harris, 619 F.2d 942 (2d Cir. 1980), rev’d sub nom. Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 
U.S. 785 (1981); id. at 949–58 (Friendly, J., dissenting). 
 41. Id. at 947 (majority opinion). 
 42. Id. at 944, 946. 
 43. Id. at 944. 
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The Second Circuit majority found no deliberate 
misrepresentation by the agent, as the widow had disclosed her 
divorce orally to the agent but had not revealed to the agent her ex-
husband’s death.44 But the panel still held the agency estopped from 
denying benefits for the period seemingly excluded by the one-year 
limitation period.45 The writing judge’s theory was that an internal 
agency guideline had directed agents to advise applicants of the 
benefits of a written filing, even in doubtful situations, and that agents 
had been told not to discourage filings even when an applicant was 
likely ineligible.46 The widow recounted her alleged conversation with 
the agent; the agent could not remember.47 Writing in dissent from the 
result and from the opinion’s author’s reliance on the guidelines to 
overcome the regulation, Judge Friendly observed, 
  By dispensing with compliance with an admittedly valid 
regulation which requires a written application on the appropriate 
form for a wide variety of social security benefits, the majority opens 
the door of the federal fisc not simply to [the widow], whom we at 
least know to have visited the HEW office and said something, but 
to thousands who merely will make a detailed claim that they have 
done so and whom[, without a writing,] there is no effective means 
of rebutting. Millions of dollars will have to be expended simply to 
ascertain whether conditions of eligibility claimed in a subsequent 
written application existed at the time of the alleged oral one.48 
And, in the same case, Judge Friendly pointed to another 
practical anomaly in the panel’s rationale: 
Clearly it is in the public interest for an agency with over 80,000 
employees, making more than 1,250,000 disability determinations 
alone a year, . . . to issue housekeeping instructions to its employees 
in the interest of uniform, fair and efficient administration. But it is 
perplexing why an agency that issues such instructions should be 
held to a higher legal standard of dealing with its clients than one 
that does not.49 
 
 44. Id. at 947–49. 
 45. Id. at 948. 
 46. Id. at 947–48. 
 47. Id. at 944–45. 
 48. Id. at 949 (Friendly, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
 49. Id. at 956. 
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Not many such dissents bring immediate vindication, but in this 
case, the Supreme Court reversed the panel decision in a per curiam 
decision, saying, “We agree with the dissent.”50 
Judge Friendly identified strongly with the judicial enterprise. 
His intellect and interests cast him as a great scholar; his 
temperament and drive, as a success in law practice; and his 
imagination and literary flair, as a natural writer. But Judge Friendly’s 
combination of talents—each one possessed to an unusual degree—
did not fit him perfectly into the pigeonhole of any of these vocations. 
Judging, to which he turned with relief after hard years in private 
practice, drew on all of his gifts. In return, he cared greatly about the 
court system and the quality and consequences of its product. 
A fourth theme in Judge Friendly’s separate opinions was 
attention to further proceedings after the decision. Appellate judges, 
having spent their efforts deciding whether further proceedings are 
required in the case at hand, sometimes fail to consider carefully just 
what should happen in the lower court once a remand is agreed to be 
necessary. Yet in framing a remand, an appeals court enjoys unusual 
statutory discretion, and Judge Friendly was always attentive to this 
next stage.51 Again, this attention reflected not only his capacity for 
the practical but also his ability to see further down the road than 
other judges could see. 
A good example is furnished by Judge Friendly’s dissent in New 
York Life Insurance Co. v. Connecticut Development Authority.52 In 
that case, an insurance company had brought an interpleader action 
to decide conflicting claims to the cash surrender value of a policy it 
had issued.53 After two of the three potential claimants had disclaimed 
any interest, the cash surrender value had been awarded by consent 
to the third, who was the policyholder.54 The district court had then 
enjoined all three claimants from bringing further proceedings against 
the insurer in other courts and had also precluded several related tort 
 
 50. Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785, 788 (1981). 
 51. 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (2006) (authorizing the appellate court to “direct the entry of such 
appropriate judgment, decree, or order, or require such further proceedings to be had as may be 
just under the circumstances”). 
 52. N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Conn. Dev. Auth., 700 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1983); id. at 97–98 
(Friendly, J., dissenting); see also Dickerson v. Fogg, 692 F.2d 238, 249 (2d Cir. 1982) (Friendly, 
J., dissenting) (“The majority follows the district court in condemning [the arresting officers] for 
not conforming to a code of conduct which defies human nature.”). 
 53. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 700 F.2d at 92. 
 54. Id. at 93. 
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claims that had been brought by the policyholder against the insurer.55 
The district judge had understood the policyholder to consent to this 
resolution;56 but, after obtaining his payment, the policyholder sought 
to preserve the tort claims and appealed when the district court 
refused to alter its injunction.57 
On appeal, the majority of the Second Circuit panel thought it 
unclear whether the consent extended to barring the separate tort 
claims and remanded for further proceedings.58 Judge Friendly 
thought the district court had permissibly found consent and opposed 
the remand on the merits. He then continued, writing that even if the 
tort claims were to be reinstated, they were so clearly frivolous that 
the remand itself—intended to clarify whether consent had been 
given—would be a waste of time: 
  Beyond all this a remand is essentially futile. There was simply 
nothing to support [the policyholder’s] contention that New York 
Life had acted in bad faith in instituting an interpleader action with 
knowledge that there were no adverse claims . . . . If Judge Carter [in 
the district court on remand] should alter his conclusion as to 
consent, which the majority wisely does not require, he would then 
be obliged to face this issue of New York Life’s good faith and there 
can be no reasonable doubt what he would find.59 
Three of the four concerns emphasized in Judge Friendly’s 
dissents—fairness, relative competence, and practical effects—are 
ones that some laymen, and even some judges, may view as extrinsic 
to the application of legal rules. But Judge Friendly, like any sensible 
judge, knew well how much open space exists in the law and 
recognized the role that other social values play in deciding cases. In 
truth, discerning the vector that is the composite of incommensurable 
values is one of the unspoken skills in judging. When a panel author 
saw matters more narrowly, a separate opinion from Judge Friendly 
was more likely. 
In his dissents, Judge Friendly rarely showed satisfaction in 
seeing the light when other judges had not. If anything, his 
disagreements were flavored with frustration. Admittedly, as his law 
clerks learned, Judge Friendly’s own rapidity of thought made him a 
 
 55. Id. at 94. 
 56. Id. at 93–94. 
 57. Id. at 95. 
 58. Id. at 96–97. 
 59. Id. at 98 (Friendly, J., dissenting). 
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shade impatient when his helpers could not keep up. But the sharper 
tone of his dissents had a different cause: that tone was the asperity of 
a master of the craft who sees the job being ill done, whether through 
an overbroad holding, a mishandling of the record or precedent, or an 
unjust outcome. 
Craftsmanship is far more than adornment. Craft skills—
naturally a centerpiece for the legal-process school—do guide judges 
to better reasoning and better outcomes even if they do not always 
dictate an answer. Whereas litigants and the public care more about 
the result than the explanation, the explanation is the part of the 
result that governs future cases. Conversely, the taint of a poorly 
crafted decision—especially one that is overbroad in its 
generalizations and detached from the circumstances of the case—
impairs the court’s reputation and threatens mischief in future cases. 
A balanced ticket of unhappy examples, more than a few from past 
Supreme Court decisions, would be easy to adduce. 
If craft is so important and if Judge Friendly was so much its 
master, why then was he, in almost two hundred cases, unable to 
bring along his colleagues? Of course, he may have persuaded them 
often enough. Only a file-by-file review of more than 2800 case 
folders in the Harvard Law School collection—Judge Friendly’s court 
papers that describe the decisions by the panels on which he served—
would tell an observer how often the judge won over others in 
conference or in memoranda. One can persuade another judge to 
alter language or occasionally even a result and yet leave no trace of 
disagreement in the published opinion. And when Judge Friendly 
concurred separately rather than dissented, the pressure on other 
judges to adjust their positions would be less for judges primarily 
concerned with the outcome. 
Still, on a three-judge panel, Judge Friendly needed to detach 
only one other judge from an unsound prospective opinion. Judge 
Friendly was not only a legal genius but also one with moderate views 
and, despite some sharpness in his separate opinions, a pleasant 
business-like manner with his colleagues—a trait common enough 
among those who have succeeded in law practice. True, great 
judges—like Justices Holmes, Brandeis, and the second Justice 
Harlan—may become regular dissenters in constitutional cases simply 
because they happen to be out of step with the recurring views of the 
then-prevailing majority. But most of the time, Judge Friendly’s court 
was dealing with a menu of largely technical cases that were highly 
dependent on their facts rather than with great social issues. 
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Judge Friendly had to fail sometimes. His colleagues were 
confident men with leanings of their own, and Judge Amalya Kearse, 
the only woman on the court during Judge Friendly’s tenure, was no 
less confident than her brethren. Judge Friendly might have found it 
doubly hard to reach a colleague in the panel majority who relied 
more heavily on gut instinct than on analysis or precedent—this mix 
varies considerably from judge to judge—or who had a strong 
allegiance to the panel opinion’s author, or who lacked the energy to 
reexamine an initial vote. And Judge Friendly might have been in the 
“political” middle of the average panel but, on a particular panel, to 
the judicial right or left of the other two judges. This kind of 
imbalance can sometimes be checked by en bancs. But en bancs were 
relatively rare in the Second Circuit—Judge Learned Hand 
disapproved of them60—so the panel usually had the last word. 
As it happens, the political valence of the panel seems, from the 
statistics, to have had little part in occasioning Judge Friendly’s 
dissents. Among those judges from whom Judge Friendly dissented 
most often were two liberals, two moderates, and a conservative;61 
those from whom he dissented at a rate closer to his average were 
Judges Edward Lumbard, Sterry Waterman, and Paul Hays—another 
group spread across the spectrum. And Judge Friendly sat with both 
Judges Ralph Winter and Jon Newman—one conservative and the 
other comparatively liberal—and dissented from none of their 
opinions. Both judges were very smart and, whatever their 
predispositions, were unlikely to make the kinds of errors so 
provocative to Judge Friendly. 
This brings me to the reasons for dissents and the balance of 
advantages between the panel majority and the outlier judge. The 
common aims of dissenters are familiar: to force changes in the 
majority opinion and, if possible, to alter the reasoning or result; to 
encourage en banc reconsideration or certiorari; to lay out an 
alternative approach and to warn uncommitted courts elsewhere of 
errors or dangers; to prompt legislative change; and to mark the 
 
 60. GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 441–42 (2d ed. 
2011) (stating that “[t]hroughout his life, Hand had nothing but scorn for the utility of en banc 
hearings” and noting that Judge Hand had once said that he “would ‘never vote to convene’ an 
en banc court”). 
 61. From judicial left to judicial right, these judges were Judges Thurgood Marshall and 
James Oakes, Judges Irving Kaufman and John Smith, and Judge George Pratt; Judge Richard 
Cardamone, from whose decisions Judge Friendly also dissented more often than average, is not 
easy to label in this fashion. See infra Appendix, Table 2. 
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precedent as a contested one. A dissent may have one or more of 
these aims, but it is inherently an appeal to others. 
When a panel majority writes ex cathedra, its decision controls 
the outcome and determines the law, and no one else’s consent or 
agreement is required. The dissent, by contrast, is openly advocating 
a position and encouraging the panel and others to alter or overturn 
the majority view. By criticizing the majority and advocating a 
different course, the dissenter may forfeit the useful appearance of 
judicial detachment. Instead of an air of Olympian detachment, the 
dissenter may appear more of an advocate, although this result is 
largely a matter of tone and can be controlled by the writer if he cares 
to do so. In fact, a willingness to acknowledge points on the other side 
often strengthens opinions, whether majority or dissent. 
The dissenter, however, has advantages of his own: a fixed target 
in the majority opinion, the analytical scalpel, the deployment of 
precedent and record evidence ignored by the majority, and the 
forecast of malign consequences. Few have been better at playing 
offense than Judge Friendly, who, unlike Judge Learned Hand, had 
spent decades as a litigator and whose calm concealed a toughness 
honed in law practice. But Judge Friendly’s individual criticisms never 
constituted the totality of his separate opinions. At the core of each 
separate opinion lay a proposal to follow a different path—a subtler 
reading of the precedents, an alternative assessment of the evidence, 
or a variant gloss on a statute. 
Let me say something in closing about the influence of Judge 
Friendly’s separate opinions. The dissents labeled as great by legal 
historians are almost entirely those of Supreme Court Justices, 
written in great cases, usually—although not always—turning upon 
provisions of the Constitution. Further, the dissents regarded as great 
are often deemed so in part because they were prophetic and 
ultimately prevailed in later cases. The roll-call is familiar—from 
Justice Curtis in Dred Scott,62 to the first Justice Harlan in Plessy,63 to 
Justice Holmes in Gitlow64 and Lochner,65 to Justice Brandeis in 
Olmstead,66 to Justice Jackson in Korematsu.67 
 
 62. Scott v. Sandford (Dred Scott), 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857); id. at 564–633 (Curtis, J., 
dissenting). 
 63. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896); id. at 552–64 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 64. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); id. at 672–73 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 65. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); id. at 74–76 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 66. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928); id. at 471–88 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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When it comes to dissents, Judge Friendly—an intermediate 
court judge with many mundane cases and no authority to write the 
final word on the Constitution—could hardly belong in this company. 
If he influenced the course of the law on important issues—and, 
arguably, he did affect both criminal procedure and federal common 
law, among other subjects—his articles may have mattered as much as 
his opinions, and his panel decisions, which carried the imprimatur of 
his court, had to have mattered more than his separate opinions. 
Judge Friendly was widely cited by other judges both when he 
wrote for a panel and, perhaps not surprisingly as his reputation grew, 
when he wrote separately. By one count, his separate opinions—
adding concurrences and dissents together—have been cited more 
often than those of Judge Learned Hand or of Judge Richard 
Posner.68 But Judge Friendly’s panel opinions, unlike his separate 
opinions, were controlling in his own circuit and, on that account, may 
also have carried extra weight in other circuits. Nevertheless, even his 
panel opinions were at the mercy of time and events. 
Ultimately, Judge Friendly’s most lasting influence as a judge is 
as a model for appellate judging—for opinions combining rigor, 
learning, mastery of the record and the law, insight, and balanced 
judgment. But Judge Friendly’s dissents offer a narrower yet potent 
lesson—one that brings me back to the benefits of dissenting 
opinions. The lesson turns on the potential power of a unanimous 
panel, lacking a dissenter, not only to decide a case but also to control 
what the audience learns about the case, its underlying facts, and the 
arguments made by counsel. 
One judge has observed that in a unanimous decision, “the 
victors in the case get to write its history.”69 Against this danger, the 
dissent is, as Professor Henry Wigmore said of cross examination, an 
“engine . . . for the discovery of truth.”70 For like cross examination, 
the dissent supplies for comparison, side by side with the official 
 
 67. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); id. at 242–48 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 68. A Westlaw search in February 2011 revealed that Judge Friendly’s dissents have been 
cited 227 times and his concurrences 385 times. By contrast, Judge Richard Posner’s 
concurrences have been cited 272 times, and his dissents 237 times; Judge Learned Hand’s 
concurrences and dissents have been cited around sixty times each. Of course, numbers change 
over time, and any comparison necessarily ignores other obvious variables. 
 69. Robert G. Flanders, The Utility of Separate Judicial Opinions in Appellate Courts of 
Last Resort: Why Dissents Are Valuable, 4 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 401, 402 (1999). 
 70. 5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1367, at 32 
(James H. Chadbourn ed., rev. ed. 1974). 
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version given by the panel, both an adverse commentary and an 
alternative version of the matter. The majority has cast its lot with 
one side; the dissenter reminds the audience that the other side 
almost always has arguments of its own worth considering. 
The phrase “learning from one’s mistakes” embodies an insight 
familiar to every child. Whereas Judge Friendly’s majority opinions 
taught the judicial virtues, his dissents warned against the common 
sins of appellate judging: distorting or ignoring precedent, misstating 
the record, being imprecise in thought and impractical in judgment, 
allowing unfair or unreasonable outcomes, and failing to respect the 
limits of the judicial role. Over and over, Judge Friendly’s separate 
opinions not only identified the substantive mistake in the panel’s 
reasoning but also identified the underlying sin or sins that had led to 
the error. And the sins were made vivid by Judge Friendly’s use of the 
panel opinion to illustrate them. 
These are lessons indeed for judges, and no one needs them 
more. Overworked, holding positions of authority but largely 
insulated from outside criticism, and faced with perplexing problems 
that affect many lives, judges can fall easily into such sins. True, a 
quarrel does get settled, whether rightly or wrongly, and this finality 
is no small benefit. The principal obligation of courts is to decide so 
that the parties can get on with their lives. But judges are paid to get 
the result as right as human beings can manage, and lawyers know 
when judges have failed. This failure, not dissent, is what weakens 
confidence in the courts. 
The high office of the dissent is to lean against and check a one-
sided narrative or faulty analysis, to prompt a second look by the 
panel, and to warn other courts against perpetuating the panel’s 
mistake. In Professor Paul Freund’s enchanting phrase, the dissent is 
“the second blade of the shears, against which the cutting edge must 
work, serving to make a finer and truer line.”71 If Judge Friendly was 
prodigal in separate opinions, it is the law’s gain. 
 
 71. PAUL A. FREUND, ON LAW AND JUSTICE 55 (1968). 
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APPENDIX 
Table 1.  Judge Friendly’s Rate of Dissenting and Concurring 












Cases in Which 
the Judge 
Concurred 
Mansfield 1492 89 6.0 66 4.4 
Moore 2614 146 5.6 69 2.6 
Lumbard 4101 175 4.3 122 3.0 
Oakes 4526 189 4.2 107 2.4 
Friendly 2822 103 3.6 88 3.1 
Timbers 1551 55 3.5 19 1.2 
L. Hand 5638 177 3.1 87 1.5 
Mulligan 890 28 3.1 16 1.8 
Marshall 533 16 3.0 9 1.7 
Kaufman 2340 53 2.3 52 2.2 
Waterman 2523 53 2.1 78 3.1 
Gurfein 567 8 1.4 10 1.8 
Anderson 1159 15 1.3 17 1.5 
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Curtin (DJ) Johnson 2 2 100.0 
Dooling (DJ) Kennedy 2 1 50.0 
Danaher (D.C. Cir.) Eisenhower 4 2 50.0 
Cardamone Reagan 6 1 16.7 
Medina Truman 32 5 15.6 
Pratt Reagan 14 2 14.3 
Marshall Kennedy 35 5 14.3 
Kaufman Kennedy 82 11 13.4 
Kearse Carter 15 2 13.3 
Mansfield Nixon 40 5 12.5 
Oakes Nixon 50 6 12.0 
Hand Coolidge 9 1 11.1 
Smith Eisenhower 126 10 7.9 
Van Graafeiland Ford 13 1 7.7 
Feinberg Johnson 100 6 6.0 
Anderson Johnson 68 4 5.9 
Mulligan Nixon 36 2 5.6 
Hays Kennedy 108 6 5.6 
Clark Roosevelt 37 2 5.4 
Moore Eisenhower 137 7 5.1 
Waterman Eisenhower 131 6 4.6 
Lumbard Eisenhower 158 6 3.8 
Meskill Ford 40 1 2.5 
Timbers Nixon 41 1 2.4 
Winter Reagan 21 0 0.0 
Swan Coolidge 14 0 0.0 
Pierce Reagan 11 0 0.0 
Newman Carter 17 0 0.0 
Gurfein Nixon 26 0 0.0 
